We would like to thank our loyal fellow members of the Nike Historical Society for your continued support over the years.
We will be closing the Society, including the store, as of March 31, 2024.
We have acquired a large repository of Nike technical information.
The web site will continue to be available.
It has been our pleasure to keep the legacy of the Nike missile's contribution of the successful conclusion to the Cold War.
the Board of Directors
Nike Historical Society
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION (HERC) 51ST ARTILLERY
Fort Baker, Sausalito, California 94965
ADFSF-51-CO
15 July 1967
SUBJECT: Individual Training Guide
TO: All Personnel
1. Attached Individual Training Guide is forwarded as an aid to all personnel in preparation for questions to be expected during this summer’s AGI and CI inspections.
2. All individuals will familiarize themselves with questions, answers and statements contained in the guide. A good portion of the information is applicable to assignments in other commands particularly in overseas areas.
3. The guide is not all inclusive; suggestion for changes, additions or deletions are welcomed.
JACK B MC GURK
LTC, Artillery
Commanding
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
A. Detects a target and presents it on the PPI, PI and "B" scope.
A. Tracks the target in range, azimuth, and elevation and sends accurate target position data to the computer
A. Tracks the missile by the missile beacon and continuously sends missile position information to the computer. The MTR also relays steering and burst commands from the computer to the missile.
A. (1) Director Station, (2) Tracking Station, (3) Missile Tracking Radar, (4) Acquisition Radars (Lopar & Hipar), (5) Target Ranging and Target Tracking Radars.
A. The director station houses the a. Computer b. Battery Control console c. Communications Switchboard.
A. Excess of 2,100 miles per hour (Mach 3) and in excess of 75 miles.
A. 100,000 ft.
A. Red status.
A. Those checks that must be completed to assume a "prepare to engage status.
A. Approximately 39 feet.
A. Approximately 10,550 lbs.
A. Approximately 27 feet.
A. Approximately 5,250 lbs.
A. Approximately 2,196 lbs.
A. Approximately 14 feet.
A. Approximately 5,300 lbs.
A. 3.4 seconds.
A. Approximately 173,600 lbs.
A. Approximately 2,861 lbs.
A. Approximately 13,500 lbs.
A. 29 Seconds.
A. From the BA485, a 28 volt squib activated dc Battery.
A. In right front of magazine, not in the same magazine as the igniters are stored.
A. No
a. Stop the bleeding, b. Clear the airway, c. Protect the wound, d Treat for shock.
a. Flush eyes with water, b. Report to nearest medical aid station.
a. Eyes vacant and lack luster, pupils dilated.
b. Lips dry and pale; there may be nausea.
c. Breathing shallow, irregular.
d. Skin pale, cold, moist and clammy.
a. With the head lower than the feet.
a. Pressure, b. Pressure pressing, c. Tourniquet, d. Elevation.
a. A break in the bone without a break in the overlaying skin.
a. First degree, b. Second degree, c. Third degree.
a. Skin is destroyed or charred with injury extending to tissue.
a. So that access can be gained by anyone.
a. Drink plenty of water, b. Take extra salt when needed, c. Work during cool hours of the day, d. Dress to suit weather.
a. In a large muscle.
a. True.
a. True.
a. False.
a. True.
A. Proper clearance and a need-to-know.
A. Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential
A. A form used to identify responsible persons in case a safe is left open and also to record a safe combination.
A. Send the man to the battery orderly room.
A. Make sure it is receipted for and a proper DA Label is placed on top. Blue (Confidential), Red (Secret), Yellow (Top Secret).
A. A form used to account for the daily opening, closing and checking of a safe
A. The loss or possible compromise of the combination, once a year or whenever a person having knowledge of the combination leaves the unit or receipt of a container.
A. For Official Use Only, Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, Modified Handling Authorized.
A. Turn the dial in one direction at least four (4) turns, try each drawer to be sure it is locked, enter the date, time checked and your initials on DA Form 672.
A. Subversion and Espionage directed against the US Army.
A. Yours.
A. See ARADCOM Reg 381-1-1.
A See ARADCOM Reg 381-l-l.
A. The duly appointed custodian or in his absence the alternate custodian.
A. Everyones.
A. No; the telephones and radio are not secure.
A. No; each individual is required to either qualify or fire familiarization with the weapon with which he is armed.
A. No,; all keys must be controlled so you must turn the key into the key custodian.
A. See ARADCOM Reg 380-1.
A. See ARADCOM Reg 380-l-l.
A. When directed by TM for tests, and when authorized to install the Arm Plug.
A. When directed by TM for tests, 5 minute or higher status with proper case and Swift Kick II.
A. Only when directed by TM, ie, for tests and disarm procedures.
A. Only for Humane reasons.
A. For M17 - Close access door, evacuate the area and call EOD.
A. For other type Warhead - Perform emergency disarm procedures. (Do not attempt to remove M30A1) Evacuate the area and call EOD.
A. Evacuate the area and call EOD.
(1) A dropped arm plug?
(2) A dropped safe plug?
(3) A dropped mission plug?
A. All plugs - Reject
A. Unit personnel must know all of these.
A. No
A. For for case III, XL or XS for cases I and II.
A. A toothpick moistened in trichloroethylene.
A. Dry lint free cloth
A. With clean cloth and toluene.
A. Three 5 pair cables and 1 spiral four.
A. Power for the Heat Monitor Lights in the section.
A. True North.
SEVEN REASONS TO FIRE A WEAPON
1. In self defense.
2. When directed to do so by a Superior Officer in the guard chain of command.
3. To prevent the commision of a felony.
4. To prevent the escape of a person taken into custody for the commission of a felony.
5. To apprehend a person seen setting fire to, damaging, or destroying Federal Property.
6. To apprehend a known dangerous criminal.
7. To alert the back-up force.
SIX THINGS TO CHECK ON I.D. CARDS
1. Picture matches face.
2. Army serial number is the same as on access roster.
3. I.D. serial number same as on Access Roster.
4. Name and Rank same as on Access Roster.
5. Signature same as on sign-in sheet.
6. Expiration date.
SAEDA:
Subversion and Espionage directed against the U.S. Army.
SURETY:
Security and safe keeping of a Nuclear Weapon.
TWO MAN RULE:
No less than two (2) men shall have access to a Nuclear Warhead and both shall have equal knowledge of the job to be performed and the safety and security requirements.
50 U.S.C. 797
Internal Defense Act enacted in 1950 giving legal authority and jurisdiction to Security Forces guarding Nuclear Weapons. Telling who will be admitted access and who will not; and how the weapon will be guarded and kept safe.
INTRUSIONS
If you spot an intruder:
1. Notify back-up force.
2. Shout halt three (3) times, on third time load you weapon.
3. If close enough attempt to apprehend using physical force.
4. Fire a shot into the air.
5. Shoot to wound (legs).
HUMAN RELIABILITY FACTOR: Takes into account whether a man, (A) Drinks too much, (B) Gambles too much, (C) Talks too much, or any other character trait which may be used to make the man give information about his job, missile, unit or the U.S. Army.
THREE MAJOR MEANS OF COMUNICATION
1. Whistle (Primary)
2. Phone (Secondary)
3. Weapon (Only as a last resort)
GUARD DUTY
The new FM 22-6, 1 May 1967 will be effective Army wide on 1 August 1967. This manual supersedes FM 26-5, 21 August 1956.
Chapter 4 Orders, has reduced the traditional eleven general orders to three (3) simplified ones, which all interior guards are required to memorize understand and comply with:
No. 1. I will guard everything within the limits of my post and quit my post only when properly relieved.
No. 2. I will obey my special orders and perform all my duties in a military manner.
No. 3. I will report violations of my special orders, emergencies, and anything not covered in my instructions, to the commander of the relief.
VII GUIDE TO THE PROVISIONS OF AR 381-12
1. The Department of the Army has recently published Army Regulations No. 381-12 in which it has been pointed out that the Sino-Soviet bloc countries are engaged in an all-out espionage effort directed toward obtaining the military and scientific knowledge possessed by the United States and certain other Western nations. The U.S. Army and its members have, in many instances, been the specific targets of Sino-Soviet bloc directed operations. Within the United States, Communist methods of operations have included such incidents as those stated below:
a. Efforts to collect unclassified military publications.
b. Attempted entry of restricted military reservations.
c. Clandestine efforts to obtain highly classified technical information.
d. In overseas stations, direct approach operations have been numerous.
2. The direct approach as to U.S. personnel has assumed various guises such as the following:
a. Overt attempts to obtain information.
b. Professed cultivation of friendships.
c. Efforts to place individuals in compromising positions in order that the threat of pressure might produce the desired collection of U.S. military information.
3. Samples of the types of incidents in which intelligence personnel are particularly interested are as follows:
a. Attempts of unauthorized individuals to obtain classified defense information by:
(1) Observation.
(2) Collection of documents.
(3) Personal contact with military personnel and civilian employees of the U.S. Army.
(4) By use of audio surveillance devices.
b. Attempts of Individuals with known espionage, subversive, or Sino-Soviet backgrounds to cultivate friendship with military personnel and civilian employees of the U.S. Army, or to place them under obligation.
c. Attempts of individuals to exert pressure upon known or suspected weaknesses of military personnel and civilian employees of the U.S. Army in order to obtain military information. Known or suspected weaknesses maybe as follows:
(1) Indebtedness.
(2) Immorality.
(3) Drinking.
4. Occurrences or anything resembling the occurrences just discussed must be reported immediately to your immediate superior, or commanding officer. Pending further instructions, the occurrence must not be discussed with anyone else. Superiors and commanders receiving this type of information must report the information as expeditiously as possible to their commanders in order that the Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army, or his representative the Sixth Army G2, will receive ultimate notification.
5. If at any time you should suspect that you are the object of recruiting efforts, avoid firm commitments and defer any answer pending a future meeting with the contact. Any identifying data you can procure will be of great assistance. Indicate you may give the matter some thought and and would like to think it over for a few days. Do not attempt to exploit apprehend, restrict or stimulate the contact until proper guidance has been received from intelligence authorities.
6. You are reminded that the Sino-Soviets are without question quite active within the United States in the field of espionage. Undoubtedly, there are espionage agents within this army area, and we suspect they could increase in number. You may find yourself in a position to make a valuable contribution to the security of our country. It could be you who furnishes us with the particular load we might need to identify an espionage organization. The intelligence and common sense you display upon your initial contact with such occurances could make a substantial difference in the conduct of the investigation which might follow.
7. To repeat, if you are approached, merely indicate that you went to think it over for a few days and meet again. Immediately notify your superior or commander who will assure that the information is reported expeditiously through intelligence channels. The information will be handled on the strictest need-to-know basis. The information will be held in confide until guidance from Sixth Army has been received. AR 381-12 requires commanders to encourage their subordinates to report such incidents and that commanders emphasize the protection and guidance that personnel reporting will be afforded.
8. This program is not a new one, but Department of the Army has reasons for stressing it at this time. Each person must realize the part he can play if he should run across apparent espionage attempts. It must be understood that there are relatively few American intelligence personnel and of course their personal coverage of areas and activities is limited. A great amount of such information of necessity must be obtained from persons not directly connected with intelligence.
9. By no means do we want you to spy on your associates, nor do we want you to report remarks against the Republicans, the Democrats the present Administration, or any specific laws, since it is the right of Americans to so criticize if they desire; however, consistent praise for Russia and communism on one hand and pointed derogatory remarks about the American form of government on the other, may be a case of sedition to say the least.
10. Do we have a need for security?
Yes. Enemy intelligence is continuously, ìndustriously, secretly and ruthlessly engaging in efforts to gather political, social, economic, industrial and military information of tactical and strategic value.
11. How can personnel indifference to security requirements best be overcome?
Through continuing, thorough security orientation; strong leadership; frequent inspection of security systems and procedures; and disciplinary action and reward.
12. Why is enemy intelligence always interested in collecting background data concerning personnel in sensitive or key positions?
In order that this knowledge may he exploited to their advantage. Through coercion, duress, etc., Character degenerates, disaffected personnel, disloyal persons, deviates, etc., can be caused to cooperate in manners inimical to the best interests of the United States. Additionally, background information concerning commanders is useful in determining how the commanders may react in a combat situation.
13. Why should seemingly minor incidents pertaining to security matters always be promptly reported through intelligence channels?
Because they frequently form a pattern indicating enemy efforts when similiar minor reports are centrally collected. Knowledge of this pattern is used to neutralise enemy penetration efforts.
14. How strict should security requirments be?
Never so stringent that the unit cannot accomplish its primary mission or that dissemination of information cannot be expeditiously made to those who need-to-know. Common sense should always be applied in considering capabilities, funds, manpower, time element, situation, mission, and degree of classification.
15. Should "honor systems" and "short cuts" in accountability of classified information be used?
Possibly in emergency situations. Otherwise, laxity in security procedure can only result in risk of loss, theft, or compromise of defense information. Additionally, this laxity frequently results in embarrassment or disciplinary action.
16. With who does the responsibility for security rest?
It rests with the individual commander. However, responsibility for safeguarding classified defense information rests with the individual having custody.
A. Time in excess of 20 minutes (Ref Item App B, Pg B-8, ARADCOM Regulation 350-l-5) dated 16 March 1967.
A. Between 20K & 150K at .5 yard per thousands of yards in the X, Y, H meters
A. Rated Non_operational.
A. Inter-area cable (47) is out-of-action.
A. Battery is Non-operational.
A. Non-operational.
A. True.
A. True
A. 525-4
A. ARADCOM Regulation 350-1-5.
A. To furnish range information during an ECM environment.
A. To provide simulated conditions which will permit training of operators.
A. Targets, Missile, ECM.
A. DA Form 2404.
A. In the pertinent Technical Manual.
X ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND
Pres | Lyndon B Johnson | Commander-in-chief |
Hon | Robert S McNamara | Secretary of Defense |
Hon | Stanley R Resor | Secretary of Army |
Gen | Earl G Wheeler | Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff |
Gen | Harold K Johnson | Army Chief of Staff |
LTG | Robert Hackett | (ARADCOM) Commanding General |
MG | J. R. Wynn | 6th Region Commanding General |
MG | J. R. Wynn | CG, Western Norad Region |
COL | Thomas H Tarver | 40th Brigade CO |
LTC | Jack B McGurk | 2d Battalion (HERC) CO Btry________, 2d Bn 5lst arty Commanding Officer |
PEOPLE TO KNOW
LTC | Daniel T Mahoney | 40th Brigade Inspector General (I.G.) |
MAJ | Richard C Bender | 2d Bn (HERC) 5lst Arty Inspector General |
OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND | LOCATION | ||
NORAD Combat Operations Center (COC) |
ENT AFB, Colorado | ||
WESTERN NORAD REGION Combat Center (CC) |
Hamilton AFB, Calif | ||
26th NORAD DIVISION Sage Direction Center |
Adair AFB, Corvallis, Oregon | ||
40th BRIGADE AADCP |
Presidio of San Francisco, Calif | ||
NIKE FIRE UNIT (Battery) |
Army Command Policy and Procedure and Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel (References: AR 600-20 and AR 600-50)
General
a. Information to personnel. Standards of Conduct and Army Command Policy and Procedure will be brought to the attention of all Department of the Army Personnel (Military and civilian) upon employment or entry on duty and at least semiannually thereafter.
b. Reporting suspected violations. DA personnel who have information which causes them to believe that there has been a violation of the Standards of Conduct or Army Command Policy and Procedure will promptly report such incidents to their immediate superiors.
c. Standards of Conduct and Army Command Policy and Procedure prescribes the standards of conduct required of all Department of Defense Personnel. Close adherence to high ethical standards is demanded of all public servants.
A. If not sanctioned by competent authority participation is prohibited:
(1) During the hours they are required to be present for duty.
(2) When they are in uniform.
(3) When they are on a military reservation.
(4) When they are in a foreign country.
(5) When their activities constitute a breach of law and order.
(6) When violence is reasonably likely to result.
A. (1) When it does not interfere with their government duties.
(2) When it may not be reasonably expected to bring discredit upon the government.
(3) When there is no possibility of a conflict between private interests and the public interests of the United States.
(4) When such employment does not interfere with the customary or regular employment of local civilians in their art, trade, or profession.
(5) When subject employment is approved by the unit commander.
A. In general, members of the Army may be subject to criminal penalties if they solicit, accept, or agree to accept anything of value in return for being influenced in performing or in refraining from performing an official act.
A. (1) No officer or employee in the US Government shall at any time solicit contributions from other officers or employees in the Government Service for a gift or present to those in a superior official position.
(2) Nor shall any such officials or superiors receive any gift or present offered or presented to them as a contribution from persons in government employ receiving a salary in an amount smaller then their own.
(3) Nor shall any officer or employee make donation as a gift or present to any official superior.
The 5lst Artillery Regiment was the second organization in the Army to have its coat of arms approved by the War Department.
The colors of the shield are red and gold. The red denotes Artillery while the gold indicates service in Lorraine, during 1917 - the color is taken from the coat of arms of that Province.
The green caterpillar is used to symbolize the tractor - in France, regimental transportation was tractor drawn and vehicles were marked with a device consisting of a camouflaged gun drawn by a caterpillar.
Also on the coat of arms is an ancient heraldic device known as a lion’s face jessant-de-lis. The red lion's head indicates service during the War of 1812 and the fleur-de-lis commemorates service in France during World War I.
XIII AIR DEFENSE ABBREVIATIONS
AADCP - Army Air Defense Command Post
ABAR - Alternate Battery Acquisition Radar
AD - Air Defense
ADA - Air Defense Artillery
ADL - Automatic Data Link
ADOC - Air Defense Operations Center
ADP - Automatic Data Processor
ARADCOM - US Army Air Defense Command
ATBM - Antitactical Ballistic Missile
BMEWS - Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
Bn OC - Battalion Operations Central
BUIC - Backup Interceptor Control
COC - Combat Operations Center
CINCONAD - Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCNORAD - Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command
CMMI - Command Maintenance Management Inspections
CONAD - Continental Air Defense Command
CPX - Command Post Exercise
CW - Continuous Wave
DAR - Defense Acquisition Radar
DEW - Distant Early Warning
ECM - Electronic Countermeasure
ECCM - Electronic Counter-Countermeasures
FDS - Fire Distribution System
FUIF - Fire Unit Integration Facility
HIPAR - High Power Acquisition Radar
ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IFF - Identification, friend or foe
INH - Improved Nike Hercules
LOPAR - Low-Power Acquisition Radar
MTR - Missile Tracking Radar
NASA - National Aeronautics and space Administration
NORAD - North American Air Defense Command
PPI - Plan Position Indicator
RBS - Radar Bombing Scoring
SAC - Strategic Air Command
SAGE - Semiautomatic Ground environment
SAM - Surface-to-air missile
SNAP - Short Notice Annual Practice
TPI - Technical Proficiency Inspections
TRR - Target Ranging Radar
TTR - Target Tracking Radar
UHF - Ultrahigh Frequency
USAADS - United States Army Air Defense School
VHF - Very High Frequency